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Metacognition:
Transparent Claims
and Opaque Reality
Will Schreiber-Stainthorp

I

t’s a tricky paradox that, as the mind becomes more advanced,
its concomitant increases in complexity limit its capacity for
self-comprehension. To make matters worse, it’s precisely these
more advanced minds that are most susceptible to the delusion
of omniscience. This state of affairs culminates in a mind that is
intelligent enough to approach self-knowledge, but not intelligent
enough to realize where it falls short. Luckily, some minds have been
able to surmount this particular hurdle and have reached a humbler
conception of consciousness. One example of this feat can be seen in
Patricia Churchland’s Consciousness: the Transmutation of a Concept,
in which the neuroscientist-cum-philosopher argues that the mind
is far too intricate for all of its contents to be available to its owner.
The transparency thesis—the belief that every idea, every thought,
and every desire is available for conscious analysis through the lens of
introspection—may be comforting. The problem, Churchland makes
clear, is that such a perspective is far too arrogant and simplistic to be
true.
In her attack on the transparency thesis, Churchland doesn’t
belabor any definition of the term, calling it “the venerable dogma
that one’s mental life is self-intimating and introspectively available”
(Churchland 80). In many ways, her brevity in defining the concept
is appropriate: the transparency thesis is so ingrained into popular
notions of consciousness that an explicit delineation of its tenets is
superfluous. The popularity of the transparency thesis is largely the
result of our natural intuitions regarding our mental life. The bulk of
our phenomenal consciousness consists of us thinking about the things
we want to think about. Even when we think about things we don’t
want to think about—when our thoughts seemingly drift of their own
accord—we retain awareness of and access to them. We’re left with the
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sense that, with sufficient introspection, all of our mental processes
can be rendered visible.
The issue, though, is that if anything in our mind were opaque—
that is to say, invisible—we would by definition be unaware of it.
Without any awareness of these underlying processes, we’d have no
reason to think that mental life wasn’t transparent. Perhaps, one might
argue, we’d have the feeling that we weren’t perceiving something—
that there was something there, lurking below the surface. While this
is possible, it’s made unlikely by another feature of our consciousness:
a fundamental egotism. This is arguably an inevitable corollary of
consciousness, and it results in a philosophy that’s self-centered and
self-aggrandizing. The sort of solipsism we’re biased towards makes
the transparency thesis appealing: if we’re all-knowing, all-powerful
creatures, of course we should be able to know our own thoughts!
However, as Patricia Churchland goes on to show, what’s appealing
isn’t always what’s right.
In attacking the transparency thesis, Churchland’s central
strength—which relates to her background as a hard scientist—is her
ability to marshal empirical evidence. This is a refreshing departure in a
field that can often seem mired in thought experiments and theoretical
postulates. Churchland refers to several studies that suggest we’re not
conscious of everything that goes on in our minds. For example, our
brains produce responses to stimuli of which we’re not consciously
aware. More sensationally, these unnoticed phenomena are capable of
altering our subsequent behavior. One example of this is that people
will claim they prefer things to which they’ve been exposed, even when
that exposure is so rapid—on the order of milliseconds—that conscious
awareness of it is impossible (Churchland 81). This is important for
a couple of reasons. For one, it shows how stimuli can exist and be
processed without our conscious awareness. But it also shows that our
brain can respond to these stimuli, altering the body’s course of action,
without us noticing a thing. It’s not that there are simply subliminal
phenomena in the environment—it’s that these phenomena can impact
our behavior without us having any idea that we are being affected.
Churchland also shows how stimuli of which we’re entirely aware
have ramifications we can’t appreciate. One example of this is priming,
where behavior is subconsciously influenced by environmental stimuli.
For example, one study found that giving people hot coffee led them to
categorize a person as kinder (i.e., warmer, though that particular word
was never given to the subjects in the study) than did a group given iced
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coffee (Williams & Bargh, 2008). In this case, both groups of people
were aware of the temperature of the beverage they were given, but
not of the impact that this seemingly arbitrary variable had on their
subsequent behavior. Churchland presents another example with
similar significance: without knowing it, humans judge the friendliness
of their peers based on the size of their pupils. Again, Churchland
illustrates that we can be aware of stimuli without being aware of
their effects on us. This is mutually exclusive with the transparency
thesis, which argues that the reasons behind our actions are always and
entirely accessible.
It’s only when we interrupt the processes we’re subconsciously
dependent on that their importance becomes evident. To show this,
Churchland presents the example of blind people who subconsciously
rely upon echolocation in order to navigate. These people aren’t
aware of their dependence on environmental sound, let alone capable
of explaining how they use it to navigate. And yet they clearly do:
when their ears are plugged to prevent echolocation, they perform
measurably worse at navigating. While the introspective accounts of
these blind subjects neglected to account for the role of audition in
navigation, their minds relied on that very modality. If the mental were
fully transparent, such a disparity would never occur: every factor
influencing us would be available for conscious consideration.
Another example concerning vision offers additional evidence
of the shrouded nature of the mental. Blindsight is the phenomenon
wherein people who are self-professedly blind are capable of visual
feats—distinguishing a vertical from a horizontal line, for example—
that surprise even themselves. The precise mechanism of this ability is
less important than what it says about the mind, which is that we have
entire abilities of which we’re unaware. This strikes yet another blow
against the transparency thesis: what could testify more to the fact that
the mental is mysterious than the fact that it harbors capabilities of
which we’re ignorant?
Churchland’s reference to blindsight is convincing in the
immediate, but upon scrutiny reveals several cracks that offer toeholds
for critics. For one thing, Churchland is referencing a disorder—
something that is by its nature deviant from the norm. When she
talks about blindsight, what she’s saying is that a diseased brain has
the capability to fool itself. To conclude that this says anything about
a healthy brain is quite the jump. This is especially striking because
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Churchland opens her paper by arguing that non-transparency “is the
nature of the case” (Churchland 81). If this were true, it seems odd that
she would have to refer to pathologies to prove her point.
Even when Churchland is making points about healthy brains,
her conclusions often seem extreme. For example, she claims that the
existence of subliminal stimuli that influence behavior is proof that
the transparency thesis is false. But perhaps it’s disingenuous to call
these influences anything more than reflexes. If that’s the case, then
it isn’t surprising that we’d be unaware of these influences: they are
simply environmental conditions causing bodily changes. This process
is more analogous to something like glycogen breakdown in response
to low blood sugar than it is to the mind’s production of thoughts.
What this suggests is that Churchland is intentionally inflating the
claims of transparency theorists in order to make it easier to dismiss
their arguments. A more realistic transparency theorist would argue
that only higher-level thoughts, and not basic mental processes, are
available through introspection.
Whether or not Churchland’s characterization of the transparency
theory is absolutely balanced, the issues she raises with respect to its
central tenets are insurmountably problematic. It doesn’t particularly
matter whether Churchland relies on examples from pathologies in
some of her examples of non-transparent minds, because the rest of
her evidence concerns phenomena that affect every human, sick and
healthy alike, and indicate that the mind has much more going on than
we realize. Further, Churchland might argue that even if we’re aware
of all higher-level thoughts, the fact that we’re oblivious to the factors
that influence their origin and manifestation indicates that the mental
isn’t transparent. In other words, we see the cake but none of the
ingredients, so it makes little sense to call ourselves bakers.
Churchland herself acknowledges the surprise involved in
countenancing a mind that isn’t fully one’s own. It seems like a paradox:
the entity we take to be ‘I’ is our mind, and yet that mind—our entire
being—can never fully know itself. But there’s a physical analogue to
this problem: David Foster Wallace’s meditative short story Backbone
describes a boy who attempts to touch every part of his body, only to
discover that much of it is inaccessible. Even though that body is his—
even though that body is him—absolute self-knowledge will always
elude him.
The more one looks at the intricacies of the mind, the more
this sort of inaccessibility seems inevitable. If only as a matter of
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pragmatism, it’s not feasible to be consciously aware of every cog in the
organ that controls the whole machine. One growing body of research
in psychology and neuroscience is that investigating multitasking, and
the fact that we only have so many cognitive resources to spread among
various tasks. If this is the case—and it certainly appears to be—then it’s
no surprise that we’d take mental shortcuts, even in our analysis of our
own minds.
The transparency thesis is seductive—instinctual, even—but this
doesn’t mean it’s right. If anything, this intrinsic appeal discredits the
transparency thesis, as it suggests we’d accept the thesis without much
in the way of reason: we don’t have to prove it, because we already
believe it. Our innate beliefs often merit the most scrutiny, as it’s
easiest for them to elude skeptical eyes.
It’s likely that people will resist Churchland’s reasoning and cling
to the transparency thesis because the alternative strikes them as
disheartening. We think of ourselves as being in charge, as dictating
what our brain does. But if much of what it does is hidden, we lose power
and agency over the one thing we expect to rule. But Churchland’s
attitude is a healthier alternative to this view: she doesn’t grieve over
her loss of control, but instead marvels at a mind that is powerful
enough to function in that control’s absence. The mind may have
aspects that are intractably invisible, but that only makes for a richer,
more wonderful picture.
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